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ABSTRACT
The Windows Registry stores a wide variety of data representing a host of different user properties,
settings and program information. The data structures used by the registry are designed to be adaptable
to store these differences in a simple format. In this paper we will highlight the existence of a rare data
structure that is used to store a large amount of data within the registry hives. We analyse the manner
in which this data structure stores its data and the implications that it may have on evidence retrieval
and digital investigation. In particular, we reveal that the three of the most popular digital investigation
suites fail to recognise this structure and do not allow the investigator to view the contents of the
structure.
Keywords: Windows Registry, Data Structure
1. INTRODUCTION
The Windows registry, a very extensive database in the Windows Operating system, is designed to
hold a wide variety of information used by the operating system and installed software to configure
settings and enhance user experience. It is designed to be extensible and scalable with respect to the
amount and type of data that it holds. Numerous data structures provide this functionality, the exact
specification of which has recently been published (B. D. (2009), Morgan, T. D. (2008)). Implications
of these structures with respect to data hiding and forensics have also only recently been explored in
Morgan, T. D. (2008).
The db data structure is a registry data structure that has not been described in these publications. It is
used by the Windows NT registry to store a value of a key that exceeds a certain (very large) length
and as such is rarely found in the registry. Because of its rarity and lack of specification, the structure
seems not to be supported by any of the large registry analysis software vendors in the Digital
Forensics field. Programs such as Forensic Toolkit (FTK), Encase and X-Ways do not support it and
fail to show the data accurately. This report will document the db data structure, how it is used in the
registry and what relevance it has to digital forensic investigations.
2. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGISTRY
Each registry hive is organised into a set of specific data structures each storing specific parts of the
registry. The biggest and most general one of these are called hbin blocks. They are usually 4096
bytes, 4kb, (but can be a multiple of it) and store all the other smaller data structures. The most
important structure is the nk structure which stores all necessary information to define a key. Amongst
other things it stores pointers to a set of vk data structures. This structure holds particular values for a
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key. Therefore if a key called ‘Microsoft’ has a value ‘Version : REG_SZ : 1.1’ then the value would
be stored in a vk. ‘Version’ would be the name of the value and ‘REG_SZ’ the datatype and ‘1.1’ the
data.

Figure 1: Typical Use of the Vk Structure
The situation is summarised in Figure 1. Further detailed specifications on the various data structures
of the registries are found in (Morgan, T. D. (2008)).
The vk structure does not store the data itself but rather points to another location in the file where the
actual data is stored. However, if the value is big enough the offset does not point to the actual data but
to another data structure called ‘db’. It is this data structure that acts as an intermediary between the vk
node and the large amount of data that is stored in it.

Nk

Vk

ValueList

Name: Microsoft

Db

Name: Version
Type: REG_SZ
Size of Data

DataList

16Kb of data
16Kb of data
16Kb of data

Figure 2: The Use of the Db Structure
3. THE STRUCTURE OF DB
The db data structure stores two offsets; one points to the set of data blocks where the data is stored,
the other is unknown and appears to be useless. The first pointer points to a set of offsets that point to
the actual data. The data is broken up into 16kb chunks. One large hbin block is allocated to each of
these chunks. Therefore, if the value of the key goes above 16,344 bytes a db block is put into place
where the actual data should be as show in Figure 2. The db data structure contains offsets that point to
a DataList structure. The DataList is a data structure that does not contain an identifier and contains
offsets to each of the 16kb chunks storing the value's data. The structure of the db and the DataList are
shown in the Tables 1 and 2.
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Structure Of Db
Offset Size
Description
0
dword Size of Block
4
word ID of Block (db)
6
dword Number of 16kb data blocks
8
dword Offset of DataList
12
dword Unknown
Table 1: Configuration of the db Data Structure

Structure Of DataList
Offset Size Description
0
dword Size of Block
4+
word Offsets of 16kb Data Blocks
Table 2: Configuration of the DataList Data Structure
4. THE DB SLACK
The total size of the data distributed to the various 16kb data blocks is stored in the vk data structure.
The blocks are allocated to the data regardless if the data does not fully fill the 16kb space. A marker
“0x00 00 00” identifies where the data ends. Anything after this marker is not read. The data found
after this marker is not part of the windows registry hierarchy and may contain remnants of previous
data structures or data. If for instance, the data is shortened, the end marker is changed to reflect the
new end point of the data. The excess data is not deleted and remains as slack. Previously stored
information can be found in this place. The slack is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Db Slack

5. PROBLEMS IN CURRENT FORENSIC SOFTWARE
The current leading forensic software is not aware of the db structure and fails to parse it properly. The
db data structure is processed correctly in the RegEdit32 program in Windows but offline examination
of values using the db data structure is not possible with the forensic tools. As such users can take
advantage of this flaw and store large (possibly encrypted) files within the registry in an attempt to
hide the data. As a demonstration, a large string value was placed into a registry key. The RegEdit32
window in Figure 4 shows what the data should store. This section will review the leading forensic
software and how they behave with respect to this db structure.
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Figure 4: Normal Vk Data in RegEdit32

5.1 EnCase
The leading forensic software, EnCase, treats registry hive files as extension of the file system. To
view a hive, the investigator must mount it as a drive and explore it like a file system. Data is show in
Hex as well as ASCII. It doesn't recognise the special circumstances that create the Db data structure.
In this case, Encase attempts to grab the data found at the vk address regardless if there is a db or not.
As a consequence it does not follow the db offsets and reads in whatever data happens to be at the
offset. As a result, it appears as if the key holds nothing but random data, thus giving a false
impression. The situation is illustrated using EnCase Enterprise v.6.8 (EnCase (2009)) and is shown in
Figure 5.

Figure 5: Encase Displaying Incorrect Data

5.2 X-Ways Forensics
The X-Ways Forensic v14.0 (X-Ways (2009)) program includes a separate registry viewer to view the
hive files in a similar manner to RegEdit32. Similarly to EnCase above, if a registry key with the db
data structure is found the data is read at the db offset. The structure is not parsed properly and
attempted to be read as Unicode string values. Since the values describing the db are binary the
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displayed data is nonsensical. The program throws an exception and crashes shortly after viewing the
data.
5.3 Forensic Toolkit

Access Data's FTK Registry Viewer v1.5.0.14 (Forensic Toolkit (2009)) program fails to find
any data at the db data structure and displays nothing. It does not crash but fails to display the
correct data.
6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have presented a specification for a rare registry data structure, db, used by the Windows registry
to manage a key with a huge amount of data. We have described the function of this structure and
analysed it with from a forensic point of view. As such we have described the structure’s slack that
may store remnants of past data.
The Db data structure is exceedingly rare but is created by at least one major multimedia software
provider, such as Real Player (RealNetworks (2009)). As mentioned above, the db data structure is
accessed as normal using the RegEdit32 program. Data being stored in it can be readily accessed using
this Windows built in application. However investigators may fail to examine it if viewed offline using
any of the aforementioned investigation suites. Although the data referenced may be found by brute
force string searching algorithms the data would not be attributable to any active part of the registry
and may bring doubt to any assertions made based on that evidence.
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